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Abstract 
Mobile devices now store a lot of sensitive data. With many users adapting to the 
technical advancement of mobile devices, security of the user's sensitive data becomes 
imperative. Security vulnerabilities in the mobile apps will lead to leakage of user’s sensitive 
data. The goal of this research is to propose a tool to help programmers create secure Android 
applications. The tool will warn developers about specific classes or methods that include 
security vulnerabilities such as data leakage and access control vulnerabilities. The tool analyzes 
Android source code using two approaches: 1) Parse the source code and XML to report 
vulnerabilities based on CERT secure coding rules for Android application development and 2) 
Run FlowDroid on source code, parse the output of FlowDroid and look for device ID, GPS 
location data being leaked to a log file or through implicit intent. The results from these 
approaches are combined into reports that inform developers of security vulnerabilities. The 
proof of concept of the tool has been implemented and tested. Future work includes completing 
implementation of the tool and running tests on a large number of source codes to evaluate its 
effectiveness. 
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1 CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Open operating systems are no longer common to desktops and mainframes but are now 
working their way to mobile devices. This new generation of mobile devices aids in connection 
with already existing on-line services (Enck, 2009). Mobile devices have become warehouses, 
storing a lot of sensitive data. While PC shipments have been significantly declining according to 
a report by the International Data Center (IDC, 2013 b), mobile device shipments have been 
significantly increasing. This could imply users are transitioning to the new generation of mobile 
devices. With many users adapting to the new technical advancement of mobile devices, security 
of the user's sensitive data is imperative. 
The top software platform contenders are Blackberry, IOS, Windows Phone and Android. 
Android accounts for 81.0% of smart phones (IDC, 2013 a). The Android operating system is 
designed with security in mind, and uses Linux as its kernel to isolate an application from other 
applications within the environment by using permissions (Clark, 2010). Although Android has a 
solid foundation to protect the applications from other application within the environment, bad 
design practices in the application themselves can lead to sensitive data being leaked. There is a 
need to develop tools that can statically analyze developers’ applications before they are publicly 
available.  
Existing tools have been developed to analyze android applications. COPES (Bartel, 2012) is 
a static analysis tool to address the issue of applications being given more permission than they 
need to functionally perform. A related tool named Brox (Siyuan, 2013) uses static taint analysis 
to detect if applications are leaking GPS information. LeakMiner (ZheMin, 2012) is another 
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static taint analysis tool used to detect if an application leaks sensitive information. FlowDroid 
also analyze applications statically using taint analysis to detect sensitive data leakage (Artz, 
2012).  
This research proposes SACH (Secure Android Coding Helper), a tool that combines 
statically analyzing developers’ code with static taint analysis to detect flow that can result into 
unexpected data leakage. A combined report with both methods will give developers a better 
understanding if their application is vulnerable to data leakage or susceptible to manipulation 
from other applications.  Unlike the previously mentioned tools, SACH analyzes vulnerabilities 
by directly parsing the developer’s source code. Also SACH detects if the DevecidID or GPS 
information is sent using a broadcast intent utilizing Android's inter process communication. The 
algorithms designed for SACH are described. A prototype is implemented and tested on 73 
programs.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a literature review of 
vulnerabilities in the Android applications, cause of data leakage, access control, secure coding 
practices and static analysis. Chapter 3 describes the overall design of SACH and the algorithms 
used to detect vulnerabilities related to data leakage and access control. Chapter 4 describes the 
prototype implementation of SACH. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and discusses future work. 
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2 CHAPTER 2  
Literature Review 
This chapter provides literature review in the areas of vulnerabilities in the android 
environment, data leakages, access control mechanisms in Android, secure coding practices and 
static analysis.  
2.1 Top Ten Vulnerabilities  
OWASP describes the top ten vulnerabilities in mobile applications (OWASP, 2013). These 
vulnerabilities are briefly described below: 
• Weak Server Side Controls - Weak server side controls refers to mobile applications 
having access to APIs provided by organizations such as Send Grid. The APIs can be 
abused by the user, malware or a vulnerable application on the device. 
• Insecure Data Storage - Insecure data being stored in SQLite databases, logs, xml or 
manifest files, SD cards and cookies. Best practices are often  to encrypt sensitive 
information with AES 128, do not set the mode of shared preferences to world readable 
unless needed, avoid hard coded encryption and decryption keys, use the “setEncryption” 
API to encrypt local data and add an addition level of encryption. 
• Insufficient Transport Layer Protection- Data on mobile devices are also susceptible to 
insufficient transport layer protection due to threat agents such as malware, monitored 
network and malware. The threat agents can take advantage in weak SSL 
implementation.  
• Unintended Data Leakage - Sensitive data can be leaked via malware, modified versions 
of legitimate applications or if an unauthorized user has access to the device. Sensitive 
data can be breached by using free forensic tools or by using API to access the vulnerable 
data. 
• Poor Authorization and Authentication - Authorization and authentication controls can be 
bypassed by submitting automated input to the server. Server side authentication and 
authorization must be enforced to prevent this type of attack. If the application requires 
offline access, mechanisms should be put in place so the client mobile application can 
check the integrity within the code for medications.  
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• Broken Cryptography - Encrypting data without proper protocols can result in broken 
cryptography. Threat agents to encrypted data include a user gaining access to the device 
or mobile malware representing the user.  Vulnerable encryption is due to poor key 
management, using custom algorithms and the use of insecure or deprecated algorithms.  
• Client Side Injection - Applications are also vulnerable to client side attacks such as SQL 
injection, JavaScript injection, local file inclusion and intent injection; This can happen 
when untrusted data is sent via internal user, external users, the applications itself or 
malware on the device.   
• Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs - It refers to how applications can be vulnerable 
to untrusted inputs via Inter Process Communication (IPC). Applications should restrict 
incoming IPC communications and not send sensitive data using IPC. 
• Improper Session Handling - The outcome of poor authentication can result in improper 
session handling. This typically involves using insecure tokens, cookies that have not 
been reset after authentication state changes and lack of timeout protection.  
• Lack of Binary Protection - Lack of protection from reverse engineering is also an issue. 
Applications need the ability to detect if it has been modified; Or if it is robust enough 
against static analysis.   
2.2 Causes of Data Leakage 
Data leakage happens when data are vulnerable to access outside the scope of an application 
resulting in the breach of mobile users’ confidentiality.  Methods of data leakage include URL 
caching, keyboard press caching, copy/paste buffer caching, application back grounding, 
logging, HTML5 data storage, browser cookie objects, and analytic data sent to 3rd parties 
(OWASP, 2013).  
• URL Caching - The responses and requests used by an application to access a network 
can be stored to increase processing speed.  
• Keyboard Press Caching - A user keyboard presses can be stored in memory for future 
use. 
• Copy/Paste Buffer Caching- When data is copied, it is stored into a buffer that can be 
stored in the buffer can be used later to paste the data. 
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• Application Backgrounding- Components of an Android application can execute code 
that runs in the background with an interface. For example data can be exchanged 
between applications by using IPC to send intents. The intents can be manipulated to 
breach the privacy of data. 
• Logging- Data can be stored by writing information to a log file. The log file can be read 
by other applications with the proper permission prior to Android version 4.0. The log 
file can also be read if the device is connected to a computer.  
• HTML5 Data Storage- Web pages can store data locally within an application for future 
use. HTML5 web storages are similar to cookies but designed with better security and 
performance and can store more data. 
• Browser Cookie Objects- Cookies are small data that are stored in text files for servers to 
remember information about the user.  
• Analytic data- Data can also be leaked by applications that collect information about the 
user to sell or give the information to third parties.  
2.3 Access Control Mechanism in Android 
     Unlike traditional systems where applications inherit permissions from the account used to 
run the application, each application in the android operating system runs as its own user 
account. This feature of the Android operating system allows applications to isolate their data 
from other applications but they can still access other applications data if their requested 
permission is granted. Android also uses an install-time permission model, where the user must 
review a list of permissions an application is requesting. The permissions an application requests 
during installation must be granted by the user in order to continue installation. This feature 
allows the user to be notified of what an application could do if granted particular permissions 
allowing users to make informed decisions. Another benefit that the permission model provides 
is to limit what a legitimate application could access if it was compromised.  
Permissions are defined in the extensible markup language (xml) file of the application. 
Permissions has the following attributes (Six, 2012): 
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• Label - The label provides a very short summary of the permission while the description 
attribute provides more detail. 
• Icon – Is the icon used to represent the permission. 
• Name – The name attribute is used to refer to the permission for example 
“com.example.project.General_Action”. 
• Description – The description attribute provides and in depth description of the 
permission that will be prompted to the user.  
• Protection Level – The protection level attribute allows the permission to be defined as 
normal, dangerous, signature or “signatureorSystem”. The normal permission informs the 
user that the permission does not pose as a threat to the user. The dangerous permission 
informs the user that the permission can pose as a threat to the user’s sensitive data. A 
requesting application with the same digital certificate as the application that declared the 
permission can be granted permissions if the declared permission is a signature 
permission. The “signatureorSystem” permission is similar to the signature permission 
except it grants permission to the Android system image. 
• Permission Group - Allows the Android package installer to prompt the user of requested 
permissions when they are presented to the user upon install 
2.4 The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Rules for Android 
Researchers from Carnegie Melon University published some rules that can be applied to 
android specific applications to promote secure coding (Seacord, 2014).  Twenty three topics are 
covered but not all of them are complete. This section will cover the topics that are complete and 
can be used to implement the algorithms for SACH. 
•  (DRD01-J) Limit the accessibility of an app's sensitive content provider. Application can 
share data with other applications using content providers. To prevent unauthorized 
access to sensitive data, the export attribute in the AndroidManifest.xml should be set to 
“false”, making the content provider private. Before API level 16, the content provider is 
set to public by default unless the export value specified “false”. 
•  (DRD02-J) Do not allow WebView to access sensitive local resource through file 
scheme. Malware can also manipulate web view to open malicious code (ex. maliciously 
crafted HTML) that is stored on the device. This can be done through 
setJavaScriptEnabled setPluginState and setAllowFileAccess methods within web views.    
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• (DRD03-J) Do not broadcast sensitive information using an implicit intent Another high 
security risk is when developers send sensitive data implicitly throughout the system. 
When data is sent implicitly, any application including malware can read the data.  
• (DRD04-J) Do not log sensitive information Applications that log sensitive information 
leave the data vulnerable to be read. Other applications may have access to the logs 
(before Android 4.0) or the logs can be read if plugged into a pc. It is better not to write 
sensitive information to logs or to implement a custom log class so output is not 
automatically displayed.  
•  (DRD09-J) Restrict access to sensitive activities - Restriction to the application needs to 
be considered when developing applications. Other applications can activate an activity 
for unintended use if the developer’s application is accessible due to the exports value 
being set to true.  
• (DRD10-J) Do not release apps that are debuggable - Android applications can also be 
vulnerable to be debugged, even without the source code. The debuggable attribute need 
to be set to false to avoid the application being understood by users. 
2.5 Static Analysis 
     Some research has been conducted on applying static analysis methods on mobile application 
source code. Using static analysis, different methods of taint analysis has been researched to 
trace identified variables within the Android OS to function calls. This section will provide a 
review of related literature. 
     The developers of Brox (Siyuan, 2013) analyzed android application using taint analysis to 
detect if an application requested location, device or contact information from the device to be 
sent via network or SMS. Location information is managed by the LocationManager in the 
android architecture for an application to acquire the device GPS location. The device 
information is referring to the unique identifier such as Inetnational Mobile Station Equipment 
Identity (IMEI) and International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) which are managed by the 
TelephonyManager and can be used to uniquely identify a device. The TelephonyManager also 
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controls contact information such as addresses and phone numbers. Information can leave the 
device by using the smsManager or the internet by using the socket class. 
     Similar to Brox, developers of LeakMiner (ZheMin, 2012) analyzed applications using static 
taint analysis to determine same flows (a flow is the call path from a data stored in the device to 
sink where that data is sent) as Brox but looked for information from the calendar or sms. The 
developers identified any flows between the sensitive information they declared to the log files. 
After android version 4.1, applications cannot read log files even with the READ_LOG 
permission. Log files can still be read if the device is connected to a computer (Seacord, 2014). 
LeakMiner analyzed 1750 applications and found 145 true leakages. Based on their results, 
device ID was the sensitive information leaked the most.   
     EC Spride developed a static analysis tool named FlowDroid (Artz, 2014). FlowDroid 
constructs the Android’s lifecycle to be able to handle callbacks invoked within the Android 
framework. To minimize false positives that many static analysis tools produce the author 
introduced context, flow, field and object sensitivity into FlowDroid. There is also a suite of 
mobile applications named DroidBench. DroidBench is designed to test the accuracy and 
effectiveness of other static analysis tools built to analyze Android applications. FlowDroid 
statically outperformed commercial tools such as Fortify and IBM Security AppScan Source 
statistically. FlowDroid scored a 93% recall and an 83% precision score.  
     In related research, researchers developed dynamic taint analysis tools. TaintDroid is an 
extension of the Android framework that monitors data flows produced by third party 
applications (Enck, 2014). TaintDroid assumes that third party applications are not trusted.  
Based on this assumption, TaintDroid attempts to detect when sensitive data is leaving the 
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system with the assistance of third party applications. TaintDroid provides real time feedback so 
that the user can decipher whether or not an application is doing something malicious. The 
authors evaluated the accuracy of TaintDroid by randomly selecting 30 popular applications that 
use the phone’s location, camera and microphone data. TaintDroid identified 105 instances 
where tainted data (sources) left the system; 37 were determined to be legitimate instances of 
leaked data. 
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3 CHAPTER 3  
SACH - A Tool for Assisting Secure Android Application Development 
     This chapter provides will discuss the overview implementation of SACH and algorithms 
designed for SACH. 
3.1 An Overview of SACH  
     SACH uses two approaches to detect vulnerabilities in Android applications. One component 
of SACH parses Android source code according to CERT (Seacord, 2014). The second 
component of SACH uses FlowDroid (Artz, 2014) to analyze data leakage by using static taint 
analysis. The results of both components are combined into one report. FlowDroid provides the 
functionality to analyze the developers’ code statically and detect if data are vulnerable to data 
leakage. Unlike the first component of SACH, FlowDroid added the ability to map 
vulnerabilities even if the vulnerability is in a different class where the data is being leaked.   
 
Figure 1. This figure is an overview of SACH. 
3.2 Algorithm Design for SACH  
     Six algorithms were designed for SACH. The algorithms parse java and the android manifest 
file to find vulnerabilities. The algorithms are based on the vulnerabilities mentioned by CERT 
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(Seacord, 2014). The following algorithms of SACH, FlowDroid describes the results are also 
utilized in the implementation of these rules.  
     3.2.1 Limit the accessibility of an application’s sensitive content provider 
     This algorithm is based on the rule DRD01-J in CERT rules. A content provider is a 
component of an application that can manage and share data with other applications on the 
device. To prevent unauthorized access to content providers, a developer can restrict access by 
specifying the export attribute to false. Before Android API 8, the content provider is accessible 
even if the export attribute be set false. Also before API 16, the export value must be set to false 
so that the content provider is not accessible by other applications. The following algorithm 
(Figure 2) searches whether the program export value is set to true and it is before API 16. If this 
vulnerability is detected, a warning message will be generated and logged. 
input: 
project.properties 
Androidmanifest.xml 
 
algorithm:  
variable api 
variable automatic_private_api=17 
variable regardless_available_api=8; 
parse project.properties for api version 
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store api version in variable api 
variable exported_value 
array content_provider_info 
variable content_provider_name 
variable public_contentprovider= ““android:exported="true"” 
variable private_contentprovider= “android:exported="false" ” 
 
parse file for “<provider” to “/>” 
store text into array content_provider_info 
parse each array in content_provider_info for “android:exported="false"” and “android:name =x  
if export_value == public_contentprovider 
 write to text file, “WARNING: Found content provider: ”+content_provider_name+ “set as 
public. If a content provider is to be made public, the data stored in a provider may be accessed 
from other applications. Therefore, it should be designed to handle only non-sensitive 
information.”  
else if export_value == private_contentprovider && api > regardless_available_api 
 do nothing 
else if export_value==null && api >= variable automatic_private_api 
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 do nothing 
else 
  write to text file, “WARNING: Content provider”+ content_provider_name+ “ is not set as 
private. If a content provider is to be made public, the data stored in a provider may be accessed 
from other applications. Therefore, it should be designed to handle only non-sensitive 
information.”  
Figure 2.  This is an algorithm for limiting the accessibility of content provider. 
     3.2.2 Do not broadcast sensitive data 
     This algorithm is based on rule DRD03-J in CERT rules. Applications can share data 
implicitly that is sent throughout the whole system. Implicit intents are used when actions are not 
specified to a specific android component. Since any application with the proper receiver is able 
to access the data, it is important to search the application for implicit intents. This algorithm 
uses FlowDroid to detect if the DeviceId or GPS data is being sent using a broadcast intent. A 
warning will be generated if the implicit intent is not bounded to only the application itself. 
Input:  
FlowDroid output file 
 
Algorithm: 
Variable  add_to_queue 
store line in a string 
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create a queue linked list 
read in each line 
Evaluate if the line is a detection of a flow and if it is a send broadcast sink 
if the line is a detection of a flow not pertaining to send broadcast, set the variable to 
add_to_queue to false 
determine if the line is a detection of a send broadcast flow 
if the line is a send broadcast flow, set the variable to add to the queue to true 
Evaluate if the line contains DeviceID as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true 
extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variables 
add warning message "The deviceID is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" 
within the method "?" 
Evaluate if the line contains getLatitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true 
Extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variable 
add warning message "The GPS latitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" 
within the method "?" 
Evaluate if the line contains getLongitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to 
true 
extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variable   
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add warning message "The GPS longitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class 
"?" within the method "?" 
The final line contains "Analysis" at the beginning. If the line contains "Analysis" at the 
beginning, the you have reached the last line 
If the queue is empty, then print out that nothing was found 
write to text file 
set add to queue variable to false 
else 
if the queue is not empty 
write each node in the queue to the report text file 
set add to queue variable to false 
output “Using sendBroadcast() ,any application on the system can receive the broadcast, 
including malicious applications. 
Solutions: 
Receivers of the broadcast should be restricted. Starting with Android version Icecream 
Sandwich you can restrict the broadcast to a single application using Intent.setPackage. It is 
possible to also restrict a broadcast to only broadcast within the application using 
LocalBroadcastManager.” 
Figure 3. This is an algorithm to detect if there is data leakage via broadcast intent. 
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     3.2.3 Do not allow webview to access sensitive local resource through file scheme 
     This algorithm is based on rule DRD02-J in CERT rules. The webview class allows web 
pages to be displayed within an activity. The webview is vulnerable to be manipulated to access 
local resources on the file system by a third party requesting the webview to handle an action. 
This algorithm looks at three state attributes which are the plugin, allow file access and Java 
script state. A warning message will be generated if the plugin, allow file access or Java script 
state is set to true.   
input: 
project.properties 
 
variable api 
 
parse project.properties for api version 
store api version in variable api 
 
variable line_number = 0  
array line_numbers 
variable Java_Script_State 
variable Plugin_State 
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variable Allow_File_Access_State 
 
parse each line  for setJavaScriptEnabled( x ) 
 increment line_number +1 
 if x exist  
   store x in Java_Script_State 
     if Java_Script_State == “true”  
       store line_number into line_numbers[x] 
     else if Java_Script_State == “false”  
       do nothing  
     else 
       store line_number into line_numbers[x] 
 
if line_numbers is empty 
 do nothing 
else 
 Print “Warning: Java Script is not set to false on line(s) ” 
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 Print line_numbers 
 Print “When the target activity (webView object) sets JavaScript enabled, it can be abused to 
                                                   
 access the target application’s resources” 
parse each line  for Plugin_State( x) 
 increment line_number +1 
 if * exist  
   store * in Plugin_State 
     if Plugin_State == “ON”  
       store line_number into line_numbers[x] 
     else if Plugin_State == “OFF”  
       do nothing  
     else if Plugin_State == “ON_DEMAND” 
       store line_number into line_numbers[x] 
     else  
       store line_number into line_numbers[x] 
 
if line_numbers is empty 
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 do nothing 
else 
 Print “WARNING: Pugin state is not set to OFF on line(s) ” 
 Print line_numbers 
 Print “The setPluginState() method tells the WebView to enable or disable the plugin” 
 
parse each line  for Allow_File_Access_State( x ) 
 increment line_number +1 
 if * exist  
   store * in Allow_File_Access_State 
     if Allow_File Access_State == “TRUE”  
       store line_number into line_numbers[x] 
     else if Allow_File_Access_State == “FALSE”  
       do nothing  
     else  
       store line_number into line_numbers[x] 
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if line_numbers is empty 
 do nothing 
else 
 Print “WARNING: Allow File Access State is not set to FALSE on line(s) ” 
 Print line_numbers 
 Print “The setAllowFileAccess() method enables or disables file access within WebView.” 
Figure 4. This is an algorithm looking at the state attributes for plugin, allow file access and Java 
script. 
     3.2.4 Do not log sensitive information 
     This algorithm is based on rule DRD04-J in CERT rules. The log file can be read by other 
applications with the proper permission before Android version 4.0. Log files can still be read if 
the device is connected to a computer. To protect against this vulnerability, the algorithm will 
look for data written to log files. When SACH detects that data is being logged, SACH will 
generate a warning that the user is writing to a log file and display the line number. The analyst 
will need to determine if the information logged is sensitive.  
Input:  
java file 
 
Algorithm: 
variable line_number 
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array lines 
 
parse each line for “Log.d(” x “) or Log.v(” x “) or Log.e(” x “) or Log.i(” x “) or Log.w(” x“)  ” 
increment line_number 
 
if found store line_number in array lines 
 
if lines is empty 
  output “Did not find any logs ” 
 
if line_number exist 
output “WARNING: potential security vulnerability in line(s):” 
foreach lines 
  output line_number 
 
Output : 
Prior to Android 4.0, any application with READ_LOGS permission could obtain all the other 
applications' log output. After Android 4.1, the specification of READ_LOGS permission has 
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been changed. Even applications with READ_LOGS permission cannot obtain log output from 
other applications. 
However, by connecting an Android device to a PC, log output from other applications can be 
obtained. 
Therefore, it is important that applications do not send sensitive information to log output in 
plain text. 
Figure 5.  This is an algorithm to detect the use of a log file. 
     SACH also searches if particular sensitive information such as the DeviceId and GPS 
information is being logged using the output of FlowDroid (Figure 6).  
Input: 
Read in FlowDroid output 
Algorithm: 
Variable add to queue 
store line number in a string 
create a queue linked list 
read in each line 
Evaluate if the line is a detections of a flow and if it is a log sink 
if the line is detection of a flow not pertaining to log, set the variable to add to the queue to false 
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if the line is a flow pertaining to send logs, set the variable to add to the queue to true 
Evaluate if the line contains getDeviceID as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to 
true 
extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variable  and store warning 
message into queue 
Evaluate if the line contains getLatitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true 
extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variable   
add warning message "The GPS latitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" 
within the method "?" 
   
Evaluate if the line contains getLongitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to 
true 
extract the class name and method from the line and store them in variable and store warning 
message into queue 
add warning message "The GPS longitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class 
"?" within the method "?" 
The final line contains "Analysis" at the beginning. If the line contains "Analysis" at the 
beginning, the you have reached the last line 
If the queue is empty, then print out that nothing was found 
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else, if the queue is not empty 
write each node in the queue to the report text file 
set add to queue variable to false 
Output: 
Prior to Android 4.0, any application with READ_LOGS permission could obtain all the other 
applications' log output. After Android 4.1, the specification of READ_LOGS permission has 
been changed. Even applications with READ_LOGS permission cannot obtain log output from 
other applications. 
However, by connecting an Android device to a PC, log output from other applications can be 
obtained. 
Therefore, it is important that applications do not send sensitive information to log output in 
plain text. 
  Figure 6. This is an algorithm to parse FlowDroid output for data leakage to the log file. 
     3.2.5 Restrict access to activities  
     This algorithm is based on rule DRD09-J in CERT rules. To prevent unauthorized access to 
an activity, a developer can restrict access by specifying the export attribute be set to false. This 
algorithm detects if the export attribute is not set to false, and will generate a warning message. 
input: 
project.properties 
Androidmanifest.xml 
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algorithm: 
variable api 
variable automatic_private_api=17 
variable regardless_available_api=8; 
parse project.properties for api version 
store api version in variable api 
variable exported_value 
array activity_info 
variable activity_name 
variable public_activity= ““android:exported="true"” 
variable private_activity= “android:exported="false" ” 
parse file for “<provider” to “/>” 
store text into array content_provider_info 
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parse each array in content_provider_info for “android:exported="false"” and 
“android:name=”+*+” “” 
 
if export_value == public_activity 
 write to text file, “WARNING: Found activity: ”+activity_name+ “set as public. If the activity is 
intended solely for the internal use of the app and an intent filter is declared then any other apps, 
including malware, can activate the activity for unintended use.”  
 
else if export_value == private_activity && api > regardless_available_api 
 do nothing 
else if export_value==null && api >= variable automatic_private_api 
 do nothing 
else 
  write to text file, “WARNING: Found activity: ”+activity_name+ “set as public. If the activity 
is intended solely for the internal use of the app and an intent filter is declared then any other 
apps, including malware, can activate the activity for unintended use.”  
Figure 7. This is an algorithm to detect if an Android activity is public.  
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     3.2.6 Do not release apps as debuggable 
     This algorithm is based on the rule DRD10-J in CERT rules. If the application is released as 
debuggable; this means, an user does not need the source code to debug the application. This 
algorithm checks to ensure the debuggable attribute is set to false. If the debuggable attribute is 
not set to false, then a warning message will be generated.  
input: 
Project.properties 
Androidmanifest.xml 
 
algorithm:  
variable debuggable_value 
variable debuggable_activity= “android:debuggable="true"” 
variable non_debuggable_activity= “android:debuggable="false"” 
 
parse file for android:debuggable= x 
store text into variable debuggable 
 
parse each array in content_provider_info for “android:exported="false"” and android:name=x 
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if debuggable_value == non_debuggable_activity 
 write to text file, “The debug able attribute is set to false”  
else  
  write to text file, “WARNING: Found activity: ”+activity_name+ “set as public. If the activity 
is intended solely for the internal use of the app and an intent filter is declared than any other 
apps, including malware, can activate the activity for unintended use.”  
Figure 8. This algorithm is designed to detect if the Android application is debuggable. 
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4 CHAPTER 4 
Prototype implementation of SACH 
This chapter will present the implementation of SACH, the methodology of testing and the 
results of SACH.  
4.1 Implementation  
     SACH is a Java application developed using Netbeans IDE 8.0. SACH is made up of a main 
class and a class named algorithms where all of the vulnerability checks are implemented. First 
the apk is loaded into FlowDroid to produce a result text file. The path of the Android manifest 
file, root directory of source java code and the text output from FlowDroid are input into SACH. 
4 algorithms have been implemented.. Each vulnerability method is initiated as an object from 
the algorithm class allowing the developer to skip any particular vulnerability search.  
4.2 Testing and Results 
     The system used for testing is an i7 processor using Windows7 with 16 gb of RAM. 73 
applications have been analyzed from Droidbench developed by EC Spride. The 73 programs 
were also manually analyzed to validate the result73 application SACH scored a 100 percent 
score detecting instances where logs was used. SACH was also scored an 80 percent when 
identifying if the longitude or latitude is written to a log and scored a 50 percent when detecting 
if the DeviceId was written to a log.  None of the 73 applications has the vulnerability of writing 
the DeviceId or GPS locations to a broadcast intent. Also none of the 73 applications was 
released as debuggable. Figure 8 shows an example output of FlowDroid and Figure 9 shows the 
results of SACH. 
WARNING: Found sensitive information is being logged 
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     The deviceID is being logged in the java class 
com.javacodegeeks.android.broadcastreceiverstest.MainActivity within the method  void 
broadcastCustomIntent(android.view.View) 
WARNING: potential security vulnerability in A:\Documents\Droidbench\DroidBench-
master\eclipse-
project\BroadcastReceiversTest\src\com\javacodegeeks\android\broadcastreceiverstest\MainActi
vity.java on line(s): 
57 
Prior to Android 4.0, any application with READ_LOGS permission could obtain all the other 
applications' log output. After Android 4.1, the specification of READ_LOGS permission has 
been changed. Even applications with READ_LOGS permission cannot obtain log output from 
other applications. 
However, by connecting an Android device to a PC, log output from other applications can be 
obtained. 
Therefore, it is important that applications do not send sensitive information to log output 
 
******************************************************************************
******************************* 
******************************************************************************
******************************* 
32 
 
 
Did not find dubuggable vulnerability 
WARNING: Found sensitive information being sent via Broadcast intent 
     The deviceID is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class 
com.javacodegeeks.android.broadcastreceiverstest.MainActivity within the method  void 
broadcastCustomIntent(android.view.View) 
******************************************************************************
******************************* 
Figure 9. Example output of SACH 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. SACH testing results 
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5 CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion and Future Work 
     As the new generation of mobile devices continue to grow and connect users to existing 
online services, it is imperative for mobile application developers to implement secure code to 
handle user’s sensitive data. With Android dominating the market by 81%, this means that many 
users are using this operating system and the applications built for it. The issue this research 
attempt to answer is how to help Android developer implement secure code before it is released 
on the open market for download. Static analysis is a technique to analyze source code without 
running the application on a device. Designing a statically analysis tool may be able to assist 
novice mobile application developers or developers who do not have an in depth knowledge of 
programming secure Android programs.  
     This research proposes SACH, a tool to identify security vulnerabilities based on CERT 
Oracle Secure Coding Rules for Android. It utilizes FlowDroid to detect data leakage. A 
prototype has been implemented which detects whether the application leaks information 
through implicit broadcast intent and through log files, use of logs by looking at the java source 
code and if the application is defined as debuggable in the Android manifest file. Seventy three 
applications have been tested from DroidBench  (Artz, 2014) .SACH scored 100 percent in  
detecting instances where logs was used and scored 80 percent in identifying if the longitude or 
latitude is written to a log. SACH scored 50 percent in detecting if the DeviceId was written to a 
log.  None of the 73 applications presented the vulnerability of writing the DeviceId or GPS 
locations to a broadcast intent. Also none of the 73 applications were released as debuggable. 
     SACH provides a proof of concept of being able to analyze the source code to identify data 
leakage and access control vulnerabilities. 
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     Future work will seek to implement more algorithms based on CERT Oracle of Secure 
Coding Rules for Android and identify other data leakages that can result in sensitive data being 
obtain by a 3rd party. The performance of SACH will be further tested with larger number of 
Android applications. Also due to the limitation of static analysis in producing false positives 
and false negative, finding methods to improve the static analysis accuracy will also be our 
future work.  
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Appendix A 
Table A-1 
The results of scanning 73 programs using SACH 
 Use 
of 
logs 
Longit
ude to 
log 
Latit
ude 
to 
Log 
Devic
eId to 
Log 
If app 
is 
debugg
able 
Latitude to 
sendBroadc
ast  
Latitude 
to 
sendBroad
cast 
DeviceId 
to 
sendBroa
dcast 
AndroidSpecific_Dir
ectLeak1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AndroidSpecific_Ina
ctiveActivity 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AndroidSpecific_Lib
rary2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AndroidSpecific_Lo
gNoLeak 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AndroidSpecific_Ob
fuscation1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AndroidSpecific_Pri
vateDataLeak1 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AndroidSpecific_Pri
vateDataLeak2 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AndroidSpecific_Pri
vateDataLeak3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ArraysAndLists_Arr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 
 
 
ayAccess1 
ArraysAndLists_Arr
ayAccess2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ArraysAndLists_Has
hMapAccess1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ArraysAndLists_List
Access1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_Anonymo
usClass1 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_Button1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_Button2 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_Button3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_Button4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_Location
Leak1 
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_Location
Leak2 
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_Location
Leak3 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_MethodO
verride1 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_MultiHan
dlers1 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_Ordering1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_RegisterG 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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lobal1 
Callbacks_RegisterG
lobal2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Callbacks_Unregiste
r1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
FieldAndObjectSens
itivity_FieldSensitivi
ty2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FieldAndObjectSens
itivity_FieldSensitivi
ty3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FieldAndObjectSens
itivity_FieldSensitivi
ty4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FieldAndObjectSens
itivity_InheritedObje
cts1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FieldAndObjectSens
itivity_ObjectSensiti
vity1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FieldAndObjectSens
itivity_ObjectSensiti
vity2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_Excepti
ons1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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GeneralJava_Excepti
ons2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_Excepti
ons3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_Excepti
ons4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_Loop1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_Loop2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_Source
CodeSpecific1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_StaticIn
itialization1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_StaticIn
itialization2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_Unreac
hableCode 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_Virtual
Dispatch1 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ImplicitFlows_Impli
citFlow1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ImplicitFlows_Impli
citFlow2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ImplicitFlows_Impli
citFlow3 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ImplicitFlows_Impli 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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citFlow4 
GeneralJava_Source
CodeSpecific1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_StaticIn
itialization1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_StaticIn
itialization2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_Unreac
hableCode 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GeneralJava_Virtual
Dispatch1 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ImplicitFlows_Impli
citFlow1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ImplicitFlows_Impli
citFlow2 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ImplicitFlows_Impli
citFlow3 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ImplicitFlows_Impli
citFlow4 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
InterAppCommunica
tion_ActivityCommu
nication1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
InterAppCommunica
tion_IntentSink1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
InterAppCommunica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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tion_IntentSink2 
Lifecycle_ActivityLi
fecycle1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lifecycle_ActivityLi
fecycle2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lifecycle_ActivityLi
fecycle3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lifecycle_ActivityLi
fecycle4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lifecycle_Applicatio
nLifecycle1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lifecycle_Applicatio
nLifecycle2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lifecycle_Applicatio
nLifecycle3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lifecycle_Broadcast
ReceiverLifecycle1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lifecycle_Fragment
Lifecycle1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lifecycle_ServiceLif
ecycle1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reflection_Reflectio
n1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reflection_Reflectio
n2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Reflection_Reflectio
n3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reflection_Reflectio
n4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Found 66 4 4 5 0 0 0 0 
Total vulnerabilities  66 5 5 10 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix B 
Source Code for SACH B-1 
Main Class of SACH 
public class SACH { 
 
    /** 
     * @param args the command line arguments 
     */ 
    public static void TranverseDirectory(String filePath) {//This method transverses the root 
directory of the java source  
        Algorithms algorithm = new Algorithms(); 
 
        File folder = new File(filePath); 
 
        File[] listOfFiles = folder.listFiles(); 
 
        for (File listOfFile : listOfFiles) { 
            if (listOfFile.isFile()) { 
47 
 
 
                //detects if it is a file 
                algorithm.DetectLogs(listOfFile.getAbsolutePath()); 
            } else if (listOfFile.isDirectory()) { 
                // detects a directory  
                TranverseDirectory(listOfFile.getAbsolutePath()); 
            } 
        } 
 
    } 
 
    public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException { 
        //To run FlowDroid 
        //java -cp soot-trunk.jar;soot-infoflow.jar;soot-infoflow-android.jar;slf4j-api-1.7.5.jar;slf4j-
simple-1.7.5.jar;axml-2.0.jar soot.jimple.infoflow.android.TestApps.Test 
"C:\Users\Omega\Desktop\FlowDroid\AndroidSpecific_PrivateDataLeak3.apk" C:\adt-bundle-
windows-x86_64-20140702\sdk\platforms 
        try { 
            FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt"); 
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            PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file  
            out.close(); 
        } catch (IOException ex) { 
            System.out.println("ERROR"); 
        }//catch IOException  error  
        Scanner user_input = new Scanner(System.in); 
        System.out.println("Enter the name of the application"); 
        String nameOfApp = user_input.next(); 
        String FlowDroidResultPath = "C:\\Users\\Omega\\Desktop\\FlowDroid\\results1.txt"; 
        String xmlPath = "A:\\Documents\\Droidbench\\DroidBench-master\\eclipse-project\\" + 
nameOfApp + "\\AndroidManifest.xml"; 
        String rootOfSourceCode = "A:\\Documents\\Droidbench\\DroidBench-master\\eclipse-
project\\" + nameOfApp + "\\src\\"; 
        Algorithms algorithm = new Algorithms(); 
        algorithm.FindFlowsToLogs(FlowDroidResultPath); 
        TranverseDirectory(rootOfSourceCode);//Detects logs in source code 
        algorithm.DetectIfAppIsDebuggable(xmlPath); 
        algorithm.FindFlowsToSendBroadcast(FlowDroidResultPath); 
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    } 
} 
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Source Code for SACH B-2 
Algorithm Class 
public class Algorithms { 
 
    Boolean addToQueue = false;//boolean variable to determine if information needs to be added 
to queue, intialize it to false so nothing can be added to the queue 
 
    void DetectLogs(String filePath) { 
        int counter = 0; 
        Queue queue = new LinkedList();// create a queue linked list 
 
        try { 
            LineNumberReader lineReader = new LineNumberReader(new 
FileReader(filePath));//read in text file 
            String lineText = null;//store line in a string 
 
            while ((lineText = lineReader.readLine()) != null) {// read in each line  
                counter++; 
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                if 
(lineText.matches(".*Log.d(.*).*|.*Log.i(.*).*|.*Log.v(.*).*|.*Log.e(.*).*|.*Log.i(.*).*|.*Log.w(.
*).*")) {// Evaluate if the line is a detections of a flow and if it is a send broadcast sink 
                    queue.add(counter); 
                } 
            } 
            if (queue.isEmpty()) { 
 
            } else { 
                try { 
                    FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true); 
                    PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file  
                    out.println("WARNING: potential security vulnerability in " + filePath + " on 
line(s):"); 
                    out.close(); 
                } catch (IOException ex) { 
                    System.out.println("ERROR"); 
                }//catch IOException  error   
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                while (queue.size() != 0) { 
                    //pop the queue 
 
                    try { 
                        FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true); 
                        PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file  
                        out.println(queue.remove()); 
                        out.close(); 
                    } catch (IOException ex) { 
                        System.out.println("ERROR"); 
                    }//catch IOException  error 
 
                } 
                try { 
                    FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true); 
                    PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file  
                    out.println("Prior to Android 4.0, any application with READ_LOGS permission 
could obtain all the other applications' log output. After Android 4.1, the specification of 
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READ_LOGS permission has been changed. Even applications with READ_LOGS permission 
cannot obtain log output from other applications.\n" 
                            + "However, by connecting an Android device to a PC, log output from other 
applications can be obtained.\n" 
                            + "Therefore, it is important that applications do not send sensitive information 
to log 
output\n\n*********************************************************************
****************************************\n************************************
*************************************************************************\n"); 
                    out.close(); 
                } catch (IOException ex) { 
                    System.out.println("ERROR"); 
                }//catch IOException  error   
            } 
 
        } catch (IOException ex) { 
            System.out.println("ERROR"); 
        }//catch IOException  error 
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    } 
 
    void DetectIfAppIsDebuggable(String filePath) { 
        boolean openBraceForApplication = false; 
        boolean closeBraceForApplication = false; 
        boolean isDebuggable = false; 
 
        try { 
            LineNumberReader lineReader = new LineNumberReader(new 
FileReader(filePath));//read in text file 
            String lineText = null;//store line in a string 
 
            while ((lineText = lineReader.readLine()) != null) {// read in each line  
                if (lineText.matches(".*<application.*")) {// Evaluate if the line is a detections of a 
flow and if it is a send broadcast sink 
                    openBraceForApplication = true; 
                } 
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                if (lineText.matches(".*android:debuggable.*=.*\".*true.*\".*")) {// Evaluate if the line 
is a detections of a flow and if it is a send broadcast sink 
                    isDebuggable = true; 
                } 
                if (lineText.matches(".*</application>.*")) {// Evaluate if the line is a detections of a 
flow and if it is a send broadcast sink 
                    closeBraceForApplication = true; 
 
                    if (openBraceForApplication == true && isDebuggable == true && 
closeBraceForApplication == true) { 
                        try { 
                            FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true); 
                            PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file  
                            out.println("WARNING: The application is debugabble attribute in the 
AndroidManifest.xml is not set to true. The application could be debugged without the need of 
the source code resulting in leakage of 
data\n\n***********************************************************************
**************************************\n**************************************
***********************************************************************\n"); 
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                            out.close(); 
                        } catch (IOException ex) { 
                            System.out.println("ERROR"); 
                        }//catch IOException  error   
                    } else { 
                        try { 
                            FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true); 
                            PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file  
                            out.println("Did not find dubuggable vulnerability"); 
                            out.close(); 
                        } catch (IOException ex) { 
                            System.out.println("ERROR"); 
                        }//catch IOException  error   
                    } 
 
                } 
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            } 
        } catch (IOException ex) { 
            System.out.println("ERROR"); 
        }//catch IOException  error 
    } 
 
    void FindFlowsToSendBroadcast(String filePath) {// method to find flows via send broadcast 
        try { 
            LineNumberReader lineReader = new LineNumberReader(new 
FileReader(filePath));//read in text file 
            String lineText = null;//store line in a string 
            Queue queue = new LinkedList();// create a queue linked list 
 
            while ((lineText = lineReader.readLine()) != null) {// read in each line  
                if (lineText.matches("Found a flow.*") != lineText.matches("Found a 
flow.*sendBroadcast.*")) {// Evaluate if the line is a detections of a flow and if it is a send 
broadcast sink 
58 
 
 
                    addToQueue = false;// if thee line is detection of a flow not pertaining to send 
broadcast, set the variable to add to the queue to false 
                } 
                if (lineText.matches("Found a flow.*sendBroadcast.*")) {// determine if the line is a 
detection of a send broadcast flow 
                    addToQueue = true;// if the line is a send broadcast flow, set the variable to add to 
the queue to true 
                    queue.add("WARNING: Found sensitive information being sent via Broadcast 
intent");// add warning message "WARNING: Found sensitive information being sent via 
Broadcast intent" to queue 
                } 
                if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getDeviceId().*")) 
{// Evaluate if the line contains DeviceID as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to 
true 
                    Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getDeviceId.*in 
<(.*):(.*)>.*");//extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variables   
                    Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText); 
                    if (matcher.matches()) { 
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                        queue.add("     The deviceID is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class " 
+ matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2)); //add warning message "The 
deviceID is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" within the method "?" 
                    } 
                } 
                if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLatitude.*")) {// 
Evaluate if the line contains getLatitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true 
                    Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLatitude.*in <(.*):(.*)>.*");  
//extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variable 
                    Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText); 
                    if (matcher.matches()) { 
                        queue.add("     The GPS Latitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java 
class " + matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2));//add warning message 
"The GPS latitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" within the method "?" 
                    } 
                } 
                if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLongitude.*")) 
{// Evaluate if the line contains getLongitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to 
true 
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                    Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLongitude.*in 
<(.*):(.*)>.*");//extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variable   
                    Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText); 
                    if (matcher.matches()) { 
                        queue.add("     The GPS Longitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java 
class " + matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2));//add warning message 
"The GPS longitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" within the method 
"?" 
 
                    } 
                } 
                if (lineText.matches("Analysis.*")) {//The final line contains "Analysis" at the 
beginning. If the line contains "Analysis" at the beginning, the you have reached the last line 
                    if (queue.isEmpty()) {// If the queue is empty, then print out that nothing was found 
                        try { 
                            FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true); 
                            PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file  
                            out.println("Did not find flows to sendBroadcast sink"); 
                            out.close(); 
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                        } catch (IOException ex) { 
                            System.out.println("ERROR"); 
                        }//catch IOException  error 
                        addToQueue = false;// set add to queue variable to false 
                    } else { 
                        try { 
                            FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true); 
                            PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file 
                            while (queue.size() != 0) {// else, if the queue is not empty 
                                out.println(queue.remove());//write each node in the queue to the report text 
file 
                            } 
out.println("\n"); 
out.println("Using sendBroadcast() ,any application on the system can receive the broadcast, 
including malicious applications.\n" 
+ "Solutions:\n" 
+ "Receivers of the broadcast should be restricted. Starting with Android version Icecream 
Sandwich you can restrict the broadcast to a single application using Intent.setPackage. It is 
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possible to also restrict a broadcast to only broadcast within the application using 
LocalBroadcastManager.”"); 
                            
out.println("\n\n*****************************************************************
********************************************\n********************************
*****************************************************************************\
n"); 
                            out.close(); 
                        } catch (IOException ex) { 
                            System.out.println("ERROR"); 
                        }//catch IOException  error 
 
                        addToQueue = false;// set add to queue variable to false 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
        } catch (IOException ex) {// the exception if error 
            System.err.println(ex); 
        } 
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    } 
 
    void FindFlowsToLogs(String filePath) {// method to find flows via logs 
        try { 
            LineNumberReader lineReader = new LineNumberReader(new 
FileReader(filePath));//read in FlowDroid output 
            String lineText = null;//store line in a string 
            Queue queue = new LinkedList();// create a queue linked list 
 
            while ((lineText = lineReader.readLine()) != null) {// read in each line     
                if (lineText.matches("Found a flow.*") != lineText.matches("Found a flow to sink 
staticinvoke <android.util.Log.*")) {// Evaluate if the line is a detections of a flow and if it is a 
log sink 
                    addToQueue = false;// if thee line is detection of a flow not pertaining to send 
broadcast, set the variable to add to the queue to false 
                } 
                if (lineText.matches("Found a flow to sink staticinvoke <android.util.Log.*")) { 
                    addToQueue = true;// if thee line is detection of a flow pertains to send logs, set the 
variable to add to the queue to true 
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                    queue.add("WARNING: Found sensitive information is being logged"); 
                } 
 
                if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getDeviceId().*")) 
{// Evaluate if the line contains getDeviceID as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to 
true 
                    Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getDeviceId.*in 
<(.*):(.*)>.*");//extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variable     
                    Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText); 
                    if (matcher.matches()) { 
                        queue.add("     The deviceID is being logged in the java class " + 
matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2)); 
                    } 
                } 
                if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLatitude.*")) {// 
Evaluate if the line contains getLatitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to true 
                    Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLatitude.*in 
<(.*):(.*)>.*");//extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variable     
                    Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText); 
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                    if (matcher.matches()) { 
                        queue.add("     The GPS Latitude is being logged in the java class " + 
matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2)); 
                    } 
                } 
                if (addToQueue == true && lineText.matches(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLongitude.*")) 
{// Evaluate if the line contains getLongitude as a source and if the add to queue variable is set to 
true 
                    Pattern pat = Pattern.compile(".*- virtualinvoke .*getLongitude.*in 
<(.*):(.*)>.*");//extractthe class name and method from the line and store them in variable     
                    Matcher matcher = pat.matcher(lineText); 
                    if (matcher.matches()) { 
                        queue.add("     The GPS Longitude is being logged in the java class " + 
matcher.group(1) + " within the method " + matcher.group(2));//add warning message "The GPS 
longitude is being sent via implicit broadcast in the java class "?" within the method "?" 
                    } 
                } 
                if (lineText.matches(".*Analysis.*")) {//The final line contains "Analysis" at the 
beginning. If the line contains "Analysis" at the beginning, the you have reached the last line 
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if (queue.isEmpty()) {// If the queue is empty, then print out that nothing was found 
try { 
FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true); 
PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file 
out.println("Did not find flows to log sink"); 
out.close(); 
} catch (IOException ex) { 
System.out.println("ERROR"); 
}//catch IOException  error 
addToQueue = false;// set add to queue variable to false 
} else { 
try { 
FileWriter outFile = new FileWriter("SACH_Results.txt", true); 
PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(outFile);// writing to text file 
while (queue.size() != 0) {// else, if the queue is not empty 
out.println(queue.remove());//write each node in the queue to the report text 
file 
} 
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out.close(); 
} catch (IOException ex) { 
System.out.println("ERROR"); 
}//catch IOException  error 
addToQueue = false;// set add to queue variable to false 
} 
} 
            } 
        } catch (IOException ex) {// the exception if error 
            System.err.println(ex); 
 } 
    } 
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